Apart from scores of tower blocks having their rainscreens removed and the underlying insulation inspected and more than likely replaced, hardly nothing.

Interesting - a block in Germany has also been evacuated.

http://www.dw.com/en/wuppertal-evacuates-tower-block-over-grenfell-like-cladding/a-39444121

Posted By: lineweightInteresting - a block in Germany has also been evacuated.

They should be a little more careful over their reporting - this is not (proved to be) accurate.

"It later emerged that the building had been clad in a highly flammable type of tiling that was selected for cost effectiveness rather than safety when it was refurbished last year." If I was Raydon, I'd be looking for redress.

Posted By: owlmanApart from scores of tower blocks having their rainscreens removed and the underlying insulation inspected and more than likely replaced, hardly nothing.

Like I said... http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40446579

I wouldn't expect any wider ranging look at BRs, quality or anything like that, which is what I was referring to and is what's going to make the real difference to people's lives. Taking down flammable cladding is a given.

Let's bodge by with the cheapest possible solution. It's the British way!

Anyone know why it's necessary for every individual panel to be checked visually from the outside? The Mail report includes this image of people abseiling down the outside. Do they suspect some building have been fitted with a mix of different panels, some ok some not?

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2017/06/27/16/41CE5F9900000578-4639120-image-a-31_1498575867789.jpg

Source:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4639120/Workers-strip-buildings-60-buildings-fail-fire-tests.html

BRE, like Met Office, BSI etc used to have huge prestige worldwide but after Maggie decreed they should pay for themselves by getting paid by industry, their reputation (perhaps not Met office) has tanked for obvious reasons.

Posted By: CWattersElsewhere there are report that the "new test" is some sort of flammability test on 250mm*250mm square samples of the rain screen.

I recon a 250mm square piece of most 30 minute fire doors would fail this test - it would be found to be combustible and contribute to fire.

I don't know what the test actually is - but if none of the tests have passed it's time to stop and state one or more of these statements:

a) All cladding with a combustable / meltable / .... / core is no longer safe
and/or
b) The tests we are doing now are not sufficient to determine the level of saftey or risk for the system deployed.
and/or
c) the existing tests that originally passed these panels are not fit for purpose - a new test needs to be created and retrospectively applied to existing cladding/insulation systems and replaced if necessary at the owners/insurers/government cost.
and/or
d) There were specific reasons that caused the Grenfell tower and even though the 'new test' shows a fail on all the systems tested so far we believe that some systems are in fact safe.

I have seen nothing to suggest that the system used in Grenfell would or would not pass the tests/procedures as were in force before the fire. Something needs to changed but is it the tests, desktop evaluations without evidence, inspection, quality control, traceability of materials, accountability etc etc.

On a side note - the only industry I know that seems to manage its own safety standards quite well is the flight industry. They seem to have a culture of reporting, investigating and acting on incidents (including those that did not result in any adverse affect - e.g. close misses, unexpected cracks etc). Even where there is pilot error blame may not be attached to the pilot - often it is the training at fault, or the display that need redesign. Openness, information sharing and treating the whole industry as a system seems to be the norm for the flight industry. Unfortunately I do not know the reasons why that industry is able to maintain standards when so many can't. (I have no links with this industry - and no evidence... except the usual, unreliable, anecdotal evidence)

The cause is not so clear to me - yes the cladding may be at fault - but what has lead to the situation that many (if not all) cladding refurbishments may be unsafe - this has happened after many close misses (in terms of life not damage) and a few deaths in the UK - let alone many other examples in the rest of the world.

If these new tests are so simple (100 per day) and the failure rate so high (100%) it would indicate that not enough thought went into the original tests that passed these cladding systems. These are high risk environments due to the number of dwellings in one place, these are also expensive refurbishments - the certificates/assessment for fitness for use should be bulletproof.

I think the cladding is just one part of the puzzle. It seems it contributed to the rapid spread of the fire, but as I understand it, so did the insulation behind it, and possibly the cavity closers or whatever were used. But it also seems like the UPVC window frames allowed the fire to pass between the inside and outside of the building far too easily.

And even with all those things and a huge fire, not as many lives would have been lost if the fire escape had worked properly. If fire doors had kept smoke out of the escape passageways, if ventilation had kept the air clear, if sprinklers had been fitted, if there was more than one escape route. The list goes on and on.

It's not as if any of these things were new and unknown. The entire chain is guilty of ignoring facts, making faulty standards, relying on those standards, stretching the rules even if not technically to breaking point. The system is fundamentally corrupt.

The link Beau gave was very interesting and gives some more examples. The cure isn't a simple case of tightening the regs and approvals though, at least not for all building, although maybe that's a route for large buildings. UK Building Regs set requirements, which inevitably leads to guidance and prior art etc on how to fulfil those requirements. Prescriptive building codes haven't prevented fires in those countries that use them, but they would have stopped me building my house. Last time I checked, to build a straw house in Austria you had to use bales from one specific farm and you couldn't build a loadbearing house.

I don't understand why the upvc window frames are relevant? Surely in a fire the glass will shatter long before the frame yields, irrespective of the frame material.. And in June many windows will be open anyway?

What am I missing here?

Posted By: lineweightI thought we'd established that in this case the windows were aluminium, anyway.

Why do you think that? AIUI the original windows were aluminium but were replaced with UPVC as part of the refurbishment. Are you confused, or am I?

"Others reported that they survived by ignoring the "stay put" advice given by council notices: a directive instructing residents to remain in their flat in case of fire.The emergency services originally repeated the "stay put" advice to residents while the fire was spreading; they later reversed this advice, but by then it was more difficult to exit the building"

I think I was thinking of this drawing

https://www.rbkc.gov.uk/idoxWAM/doc/Drawing-1276966.pdf?extension=.pdf&id=1276966&location=VOLUME2&contentType=application/pdf&pageCount=1

that I saw at some point, but it's a planning drawing and doesn't necessarily represent what was actually built.

Posted By: WillInAberdeenI don't understand why the upvc window frames are relevant? Surely in a fire the glass will shatter long before the frame yields, irrespective of the frame material.. And in June many windows will be open anyway?

What am I missing here?

Just need to ask anyone who does plastic to fuel. upvc under pyrolysis reduces to very flammable diesel kerosene and gas

Posted By: renewablejohn

Posted By: djh

Posted By: lineweightI think I was thinking of this drawing

Interesting. I can't find anything definitive now either way.

post 28 stated windows where upvc

Actually, no, the page linked to (an FAQ by KCTMO) says the opposite. Internal trims PVC, windows aluminium:

3 The windows are smaller
The windows fit into the existing structural opening, and the frames of the new aluminium double glazed windows are larger sections that the old aluminium slider windows. At Grenfell daylight calculations have been done to evidence that the new windows all meet the standard.

4 What are the window cills and reveals made of?
At flat 145 the window cill and reveals and cover pieces/trims were all shown as being in white UPVC, which does not need decorating. It is easy to wipe down if the cills get dirty, and the white reveals reflect more light into the room.